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Abstract 
This paper presents a comprehensive design of electricity transmission 
charges that are meant to recover regulated network costs. In addition, these 
charges must be able to meet a set of inter-related objectives. Most importantly, 
they should encourage potential network users to internalize transmission costs in 
their location decisions, while interfering as least as possible with the short-term 
behaviour of the agents in the power system, since this should be left to regulatory 
instruments in the operation time range. The paper also addresses all those 
implementation issues that are essential for the sound design of a system of 
transmission network charges: stability and predictability of the charges; fair and 
efficient split between generation and demand charges; temporary measures to 
account for the low loading of most new lines; number and definition of the 
scenarios to be employed for the calculation and format of the final charges to be 
adopted: capacity, energy or per customer charges. The application of the 
proposed method is illustrated with a realistic numerical example that is based on 
a single scenario of the 2006 winter peak in the Spanish power system. 
 
Keywords: transmission pricing, cost allocation, locational signals. 
1 Introduction 
Most of the approaches to transmission tariff design that are reported in the 
technical literature fail to address the full range of significant implementation 
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issues that a comprehensive method should contemplate, see (Zolezzi, 2002; 
Strbac, 1998; Stamtsis, 2004; Rubio, 2000; Kirschen, 1997; Green, 1997; Galiana, 
2003; Bjorndal, 2005; Bialek, 1996; Pan, 2000). This neglect is acceptable with 
vertically integrated utilities and in the absence of competition and even also in 
systems under advanced unbundling of activities and a competitive regime, when 
the transmission network is well developed and the applications for new grid 
connections are few and in well defined locations. Under these conditions, and 
given the typically low contribution of transmission charges to the total price of 
electricity in most systems, these charges could be socialized in almost any 
possible way without strong questioning. However, the situation has radically 
changed in a context where many potential investors –combined cycle gas 
turbines and large wind projects are the most frequent candidates in Europe and 
the US at least – are looking for suitable points of connection to the grid. Because 
of the large amount of new gas fired plants, as well as renewable and distributed 
generation capacity to be installed in most systems in the coming years, power 
flows in the grid are expected to increase in magnitude and their patterns may 
significantly change. Therefore, in these systems the cost of the estimated future 
transmission reinforcements will be significantly larger than it has traditionally 
been (the cases of the US where massive deployments of wind generation in the 
Midwest and solar in the Southwest are expected, or the ambitious programs in 
renewable generation in many EU countries are good examples). The costs of the 
reinforcements to the transmission network that will have to be constructed in the 
coming years will critically depend of the location decisions of new generation, 
and therefore efficient transmission charges that rightly allocate the responsibility 
for these network reinforcements have become of utmost importance. Where 
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simplicity could be a reasonable recommendation years ago, a fair amount of 
sophistication is now required.  
But, what most papers ignore is that the design of transmission charges is not 
finished with the specification of some algorithm that allocates the total network 
costs to the agents that are connected to the different nodes. Still other important 
implementation issues remain, which have to be addressed in a practical 
regulatory setting and that have been typically disregarded. These include 
avoiding interference of the transmission charges with the economic signals that 
guide the short-term behaviour of the agents in the power system; focusing on the 
responsibility of the potential new grid connections on the current and future costs 
of new network reinforcements; devising charges that are stable and predictable, 
which is essential for new investors; splitting total charges between generation 
and demand in a fair and efficient manner; using temporary measures to account 
for the low loading rate of most new lines; defining the number and nature of the 
scenarios to be employed for the calculation of charges and deciding which should 
be the format of the final charges to be adopted: capacity, energy or per customer 
charges. All these issues are relevant for a sound design of transmission locational 
signals.  
This paper presents a comprehensive approach to jointly address all these issues, 
which has been built from the experience of many years of research on these 
topics and consultancy in many countries, and which has been finally put together 
by a team of professionals from the Spanish Energy Regulatory Commission 
(CNE), the Spanish System Operator (Red Eléctrica de España) and researchers 
from the Institute for Technological Research (IIT) at Comillas University. It must 
be stressed here that transmission charges computed according to the proposed 
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approach are not meant to replace efficient operational signals sent through nodal 
prices (Locational Marginal Prices or LMPs) for energy. The purpose of the 
charges in this paper is to recover the regulated cost of the grid in a cost reflective 
manner, either by complementing any revenues that are obtained with LMPs (in 
systems that use nodal pricing) or just by themselves.    
After this introduction, section 2 of the paper describes a plausible regulatory 
framework for transmission that is compatible with the proposed design of 
network charges. Section 3 presents a method for network cost allocation that is 
based on the responsibility of the network users in the incurred transmission costs. 
Section 4 provides answers to the remaining major implementation issues. A 
representative numerical case example is presented in section 5, corresponding to 
the application of the proposed methodology to a winter peak load scenario for the 
Spanish system in the year 2006. Lastly, section 6 concludes.  
2 A plausible transmission regulatory framework 
There is no universal consensus on the most adequate regulatory approach for 
transmission investment, access and pricing. Here a simple, but most sensible, 
regulatory framework will be presented schematically, with the only purpose to 
provide a reference scenario within which the proposed design of transmission 
charges would make sense. Certainly the same design of charges, as it is or with 
minor changes, would be also applicable to other situations. But it is convenient 
here to stress the point that one should not design the three major pieces of 
transmission regulation – investment, access and pricing - independently.  
In the simplest –and most recommended – regulatory approach, a plan for 
transmission network expansion would be prepared by the System Operator, as 
the entity with the largest and most immediate expertise in the needs for new 
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reinforcement, after receiving inputs and while maintaining good communication 
with all stakeholders. The plan should meet some prescribed “regulatory test” (set 
of conditions, either economic, technical or both, that justify the need for new 
investments) and, based on this same regulatory test, be approved by the 
regulatory authorities. The transmission facilities that are included in the plan will 
be built, either via a public auction scheme or by the incumbent transmission 
company – either a Transmission System Operator, an independent purely 
network company or some other scheme -, under some kind of cost-of-service 
remuneration. The incurred costs would be charged to the network users – 
typically both generators and consumers – under publicly established rules. Under 
this scheme investors should not have objections to invest in new transmission 
facilities (assuming the rate of return is attractive). The simple idea behind this 
simple scheme that is in use in several countries is just to make the business of 
transmission investment as “unexciting” (“boring” or “uneventful”) as possible. 
Sophistication and complexity in transmission planning – “leaving it to the 
market”, for instance - only cause indecision by investors, higher capital costs and 
– most frequently – lack of investment.  
Access priorities during operation – i.e. congestion management and any 
associated charges – should not be mixed-up with transmission charges, which are 
related to longer term issues: cost recovery of transmission investments and 
locational signals for new network users. Any congestion rents that could be 
collected because of the application of nodal prices or any scheme of firm 
transmission rights should be deducted from the total annual transmission cost 
that has to be paid by transmission charges. If none of these schemes apply, 
transmission charges should cover the total amount.  
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The cost of the facilities that directly connect large consumers or generators to the 
transmission grid, with lines of at most a few kilometres, is usually recovered by 
dedicated transmission access charges. This paper is concerned with the design of 
transmission charges that are meant to recover the remaining network cost (the 
majority, by far). Therefore charges for short direct connection lines will be 
ignored here. Longer connection lines (the limit is somewhat arbitrary), therefore 
with a significant cost, must be treated under the general scheme that is presented 
here, since the cost may have an impact on the feasibility of the generation 
(typically) project and the existence of benefits of the project for the consumers 
should be then factored in.  
2.1 Basic cost allocation guidelines 
By now everybody should agree on some basic sound principles of transmission 
pricing, see (Pérez-Arriaga and Smeers, 2005): The charges should be 
independent on commercial transactions. They should rather be based on cost-
causality principles, i.e. the cost of transmission investments should be charged to 
those network users who benefit from them (since any new transmission facility is 
built to increase the expected benefits that all network users will globally obtain 
from the operation of the system with this installed facility) or, equivalently, to 
those network users who have been responsible for incurring in the network 
investment costs (since the investments are made when they result in total benefits 
for the network users that exceed the additional transmission costs). In practice 
this has proven difficult to do in most cases and some proxy – such as network 
utilization – may have to be used instead.  
Depending on the characteristics of the particular system (size, how well meshed 
is the network, fraction of the total electricity costs attributable to transmission, 
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number and type of prospective new network users, regulatory history) the most 
adequate method of allocation may vary. In those cases of costly lines that only 
benefit a subset of the network users or that even hurt some others, in non-well-
meshed networks, where the economic viability of an associated generation 
project may be at stake, it is recommended to base the allocation of costs in the a 
priori estimation of the benefits for each network user. This should preferably be 
done by using a one-shot computation, as explained in section 4.3 later, thus 
avoiding the difficulties of the future re-evaluation of the benefits.  
Except for those extreme - but not unusual – cases, here it is recommended to 
resort to some measure of the electrical use of a line (or any other transmission 
facility) by the agents as a sensible proxy to the economic benefits that these 
agents will obtain from the existence of this line. Or, in other words, that the 
responsibility of each agent in the construction of a line is deemed to be 
proportional to the amount of use of the line by the agent.  
Unfortunately, computing the electrical utilization of lines by agents is not a 
simple task, since there is no indisputable method to do it. Several methods to 
determine network use have been proposed and applied, with results that vary 
significantly from one another. It is important to keep in mind that the final 
objective is not computing network utilization per se, but determining the 
responsibility of agents in the construction of lines. Therefore, the method 
employed to compute network use should not deviate from the implicit purpose of 
identifying somehow the agents that are responsible for the development of the 
lines or, in other words, who benefit from them.  
Current transmission tariffs in most countries do not contain any locational signals 
and they simply disregard the need for assigning the cost of each transmission line 
 7
to those agents that cause the system to incur this cost, see for instance (ETSO, 
2008) and (Lusztig et al., 2006). Whenever this is an acceptable simplification, 
regulators have settled for simple transmission charges that socialize the total cost 
of the network to its users, or frequently just to consumers. This is not the 
situation that is assumed in this paper, for the reasons explained above. It is the 
opinion of the authors that, as time passes and all kinds of new generation 
compete to enter into the system, clear locational signals – including transmission 
tariffs prominently – will be more and more necessary.  
3 Transmission network cost allocation 
3.1 A first pass in the allocation of network costs 
The computation process consists of several stages, of which this is the first one. 
Some scheme must be used to determine in a first approximation how much of the 
power flow in each one of the lines can be attributed to each generator and load in 
the system. Subsequent refinements will be presented later in this section.  
At this stage, the transmission tariff designer must select a specific cost allocation 
algorithm. General guidelines have been already provided. Here it will be 
assumed that a method that is based on some measure of network electrical 
utilization is adequate. Then it is recommended to resort to any of the very few 
sound available methods, such as Average Participations (AP), see (Bialek, 1996; 
Kirschen et al., 1997), or Aumann-Shapley, see (Junqueira et al., 2007). In this 
paper, AP will be used for the explanation that follows and also in the numerical 
case example. Except when otherwise indicated or obvious, the rest of this paper 
is applicable regardless of the specific adopted algorithm. Thus, it must be 
stressed here that, whether the AP method or any other electrical use-based 
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algorithm is applied to allocate the costs of the grid, the overall tariff design that is 
proposed here remains valid.  
The AP method will be now introduced for a single scenario of generation, 
demand and the corresponding actual flows. Later it will be explained how to 
account for multiple scenarios that are meant to represent a year or any other 
period of time. The basic idea behind the AP method, see (Bialek, 1996; Olmos 
and Pérez-Arriaga, 2007) for details, is that a simple and reasonable assumption 
(which cannot be proved or disproved) allows one to track the actual line flows in 
a given operation scenario, upstream and downstream to the generators and loads 
that can be associated plausibly to them. The basic assumption is that power 
inflows into a node contribute to the outflows from the node in proportion to the 
volume of the latter. The AP method reflects well the balance of generation and 
demand in the different areas for any given operation scenario and results in cost 
allocations that make general economic and physical sense.  
The AP method only provides L and G utilization factors for those nodes where 
there are generation and load already. Therefore, just applying the AP method to a 
snapshot representing the real operation of the system does not allow one to 
compute the G and L use factors for many of the system nodes. In order to 
compute G and L factors for every node, one must modify the original scenarios 
slightly, by introducing in each of the nodes a small fictitious demand and 
generator of the same magnitude. 
Once the participation factors of each one of the agents in the use of each one of 
the lines are known, in the following stages these factors will be conveniently 
modified to account for several additional considerations: the different ways in 
which the addition of a new generator or demand may affect the existing pattern 
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of flows in a network; the treatment of the unused capacity of lines, in particular 
for underutilized recent lines; the share of total network costs between generators 
and consumers; and the influence that the time of entry in the system of a new 
generator or load may have on the responsibility over the incurred costs in every 
transmission facility.  
3.2 Accounting for different patterns of modification of the 
network flows 
The new concern that is addressed in this section is to associate the existence or 
the activity of the different network users and the preliminary evaluation of their 
contributions to the network flows with the corresponding need (or the lack of it) 
to reinforce the transmission grid. The guiding principle will be to try to find 
associations between the presence and the activity of a generator or load and the 
associated incremental changes in the network flows. This is only applicable to 
methods based on electrical utilization, such as AP.  
If the electrical use of a line by an agent is defined as the impact of the power 
produced or consumed by the agent on the line flow, then one must conclude that 
agents can either make a positive or a negative use of a line. For instance, 
installing generation capacity in an importing area will probably reduce the 
amount of power flowing over the lines connecting this area to others, and should 
be considered as a “negative use” of the line.  
Most grid reinforcements are needed to cope with incremental flows produced by 
new generators and loads3. Therefore, new network users should be held 
responsible for the cost of those lines that are built so that the grid can cope with 
the flows that they create. The identification of the responsibility in the creation of 
incremental flows by new generators and loads is far from obvious. New 
                                                 
3 Investments are also made to extend the useful life of existing lines.  
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generation is built to replace inefficient generation or to serve new load. The 
changes in power flows result from the joint evolution of the global patterns of 
generation and load in the system4. 
If the distribution of generation and load in the system grid does not change 
significantly over time, i.e. if the load and generation growth in each area have 
been approximately proportional to the amount of generation or load that already 
existed in that area, then line flows have probably increased always with the 
passing of time, and these increments only have depended on the load growth rate 
and the existing global pattern of generation and load. The global pattern of 
generation and load, together with the topology of the grid, determines in this case 
the pattern of flows in the system. Therefore, in this situation, one could conclude 
that the existing pattern of flows in the system should be representative of the 
increments in line flows that are produced by the installation of new generation 
and load. Then, just by following the existing line flows, one could determine 
where the power produced by each new generator is consumed. 
According to the reasoning above, new generation in each area A would only be 
devoted to physically supplying the load growth of those consumer centres 
already being served by the generation in area A. However, there is also the 
possibility that new generation in an area replaces the generation that already 
exists, or could be installed, in other areas. Therefore, the method employed to 
determine the location of the load served by each new generator should consider 
both possibilities. This is in accordance with the fact that the distribution of 
                                                 
4 Given that investment decisions by generation companies (and maybe also those by consumers) 
can be conditioned by the decisions by the remaining agents on where to install new generation or 
load, one cannot claim that the location of the generator ‘responding’ to an increase in the power 
consumption by a load is not affected by the location of the latter. Hence, methods to compute the 
responsibility of network users in line flows cannot be based on this assumption. In general there 
is a stronger relationship between recent new network users and recent or near future network 
reinforcements than there is with network assets that were built a long time ago.  
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generation and load in the system gradually changes over time. Among other 
reasons for this, distribution of the natural resources used to produce energy may 
change or companies may be encouraged by energy prices or regulation to install 
a significant amount of new generation in importing areas. A totally symmetric 
reasoning can be made for new demand.  
The proposed approach 
The following discussion assumes that AP has been used for the preliminary cost 
allocation. The original AP method assumes that the agents either contribute 
positively to the flow over a line, thus reinforcing it, or do not use at all that line. 
Thus, AP does not consider the possibility that an agent might contribute to 
decreasing the flow over a line. However, as explained above, installing a new 
generator in a certain node may lead to one of the two following situations: a) the 
amount of power exported from this node to others may increase, or b) the amount 
of power imported by the node from others may decrease. Similar considerations 
can be made with respect to new loads.  
This leads to simultaneously considering the new generator as an increase in the 
local generation (the one existing in a certain node N) and as a decrease in the 
local demand, i.e. as a negative load at N. Therefore, when computing the 
incremental utilization that a generator at node N makes of the grid, it is proposed 
here to take into account both the participation, according to the original version 
of AP, of the generation located in node N in the use made of the grid (utilization 
factor GN), and the unit participation, also according to AP, of the demand in the 
same node n in the utilization of the grid (utilization factor LN). The local 
generation charge shall be considered with positive sign, since installing a new 
power plant would increase the total amount of generation in the corresponding 
 12
node, while the local load charge should be considered with a negative sign, since 
installing a new generator would reduce the net demand in the node. 
It is proposed here to compute the per unit contribution of the generation in a node 
N to the incremental use of each line as the weighted average of the unit 
utilization factor computed with AP for the generation in node N (factor G) and 
the unit use factor, with a negative sign, computed with AP for the demand in the 
node (factor L). The weighing factors employed may vary. In any case, both 
weighing factors should add up to 1. Equation (1) provides the mathematical 
expression of the unit contribution by the generation in a node to the incremental 
use made of each line in particular (or the grid in general): 
, , ,(1 ) ,
PM
N G N G N G N DC F C F C= − −  PMN                                                                             (1)                             
where  is the unit contribution to the incremental use made of the grid of the 
new generation located in node , 
NC
N ,
PM
G NC
,
PM
 is the network unit use factor for the 
generation in node  according to AP, N D N
F
C  is the network unit use factor for the 
demand in that node provided by AP and  represents the weight assigned to 
 (and, therefore,  is the weight assigned to 
,G N
,
PM
G NC ,G NF−1 ,PMD NC ). 
The impact of increasing the generation in node  on the system line flows 
mainly depends on the pattern of inflows into the node and outflows from the 
node
N
5. Therefore, the factors used to weigh the per unit L and G use factors 
produced by AP for a node should be proportional to the total amount of power 
flowing into the area where node is located and the total amount of power 
N
N
flowing from that area into others, respectively. Our objective is estimating the 
                                                 
5 Consider, for example, a purely exporting node N where the amount of generation and load is 
similar (although there must be some more generation than load). It seems clear that, regardless of 
the generation/load balance in the node, most of the new generation installed locally would 
contribute to meet the increment in demand in the rest of the system, which would be much larger 
than that in the node. 
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impact that installing new generation in node N  would have on the power 
balance in this area and, therefore, on the flows between this area and others. 
According to this, the mathematical expression of the weighing factor ,G NF  in (1) 
must be: 
,
E
N
G N E I
N N
F φφ φ= +                                                                                                       (2)                             
where INφ  and ENφ  represent the total am
s been followed to weigh the importance, or pr ability of 
3.3 Accounting for the loading rate of transmission facil
eir 
enerators or consumers that initially use these recent and underloaded 
lines should not pay their total annualised cost, since these individual agents can 
ount of power flowing into the area where 
ob
ities  
node N s loca d and the total amount of power flowing from that area into 
others, respectively. 
The criterion that ha
i te
occurrence, of situations 1 and 2 above, once new generation is installed in a 
node, is intimately linked to the current pattern of flows in the system and, 
therefore, to the generation and load patterns as well. Consequently, this criterion 
is more likely to successfully represent the effect that adding generation in each 
node is expected to have on the line flows. The same process can be followed in 
order to compute the contribution of the new load to be installed in each node to 
the system line flows. 
Transmission lines have very long useful lives and the decision on th
construction should consider the estimated future evolution of the power system. 
As a consequence, it is frequent that a line that has been recently built is loaded 
well below the average loading rate of more mature transmission lines in the same 
region. 
Those g
 14
only be held responsible for the construction of a small fraction of their capacity. 
Agents are not benefiting from most of the capacity of these lines because this 
capacity cannot be expected to be used under any circumstance in the short term 
future. 
In order to determine the fraction of the cost of each line to be assigned 
proportionally to the responsibility of agents in their construction (the so called 
3.4 Sharing the total network costs between generators and 
As explained in the previous section, the total cost of each line should be divided 
into two parts. The first one should, in principle, be allocated to the network users 
(both generators and loads) according to their responsibility in the construction of 
cost of the ‘used’ fraction of each line), one may think of comparing the loading 
rate of this line with the average loading rate for this type of lines in the system. 
Line types should be defined according to the location of each line and its 
function. A fraction of the cost of each line equal to the ratio of the load rate of the 
line to the average load rate for lines of the same type could be allocated based on 
the application of the principle of cost causality that has been described in section 
2.1. If the former ratio is greater or equal to 1 for a line, the whole cost of this line 
would be allocated taking only into account the responsibility of agents in the 
construction of the line. Otherwise, cost causality would be used to allocate a 
fraction of the total line cost equal to the above mentioned ratio. The remaining 
part of the cost of the line should probably be socialized to demand, since the 
short and long term decisions by consumers are less sensitive to the level of 
transmission charges than those made by generators, and there is no particular 
reason to use a different criterion.  
consumers 
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the line6. One can refer to this part as the cost of the ‘used’ fraction of the li
The remaining com
ne. 
ponent of the cost of each line could be socialized to 
generators and/or loads, though probably it should be socialized only to demand 
since, in the absence of any logic of cost causality (mostly based on benefits or a 
proxy to them), consumers are the final recipients of the electricity service. This 
section discusses how to split the cost of the ‘used’ fraction of each line between 
generation and load in the system.  
When examining the justification of transmission investments one will find that 
some lines are built to allow the export of generation from areas with excess of 
production, while others may be required to meet the demand of major load 
centres. In principle, the cost of the ‘used’ fraction of each line should be 
apportioned to generation and load in proportion to the aggregate economic 
benefits that each of the two groups of agents obtain from the existence of the 
line. However, in practice this may often prove impossible, due to the difficulties 
associated to determining the benefits that agents obtain now from a line that has 
been in operation for many years or to estimating the future benefits from a 
hypothetical line whose construction is presently being considered. 
Here it is proposed to apportion the cost of the ‘used’ fraction of each line in 
proportion to the global incremental use of the line that can be attributed to the 
generation, on the one hand, and the load, on the other. However, even computing 
responsibility in network use may result in an ambiguous outcome, because of the 
assumptions that is necessary to make in basically any method, which in most 
cases actually predetermine the split between generation and demand.  
                                                 
6 Sending locational signals to consumers may not be necessary in many systems, as discussed in 
section 2. In this case, the total fraction of the cost of each line to be paid by loads should be 
socialized among them. 
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In practice, it may be desirable to administratively determine from the outset the 
fraction of the cost of the grid to be paid by generators (and, therefore, the fraction 
to be recovered from loads). Taking into account the fact that the method (AP) 
that has been recommended here to track down the existing flows in each scenario 
arge for all customers, which is a longstanding regulatory 
allocates 50% of the use of each line to generators, and the remaining 50% to 
loads, the cost of the ‘used’ fraction of each line should also be allocated 50/50 to 
generation and demand in the system. However, this rule can be easily modified 
if, according to some reasonable criterion (such as a hypothetical rule to 
harmonize transmission charges within the region, as already decided for the EU 
Internal Electricity Market), competent authorities decide that generators as a 
whole should pay at most a certain fraction of the cost of the grid (either of the 
grid as a whole or line by line, depending also on the method), with the demand 
being charged the rest. 
There is one major difference between generation and demand when it comes to 
the allocation of transmission network charges. Geographically differentiated 
network charges by nodes or areas are not compatible with the existence of a 
uniform transmission ch
principle in many countries, see, for example (ITC, 2007). Besides, location-
differentiated transmission charges are unlikely to affect the decisions by 
consumption agents on where to install new loads, since the transmission grid cost 
typically represents a small fraction of the total electricity supply cost. On the 
other hand, the level of the transmission charge may have a significant impact on 
the expected net profits of prospective generators, who therefore will be more 
likely to respond to these locational signals when choosing a site.  
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3.5 Accounting for the time of entry into the system  
As explained before, most new lines are built in order to cope with the 
incremental power flows resulting from the installation of new generators and 
loads. Hence, new generators and loads are, to a large extent, responsible for the 
pute tariffs 
are unable to discriminate between existing and new generators and loads in order 
to identify those responsible for the installation of transmission reinforcements. 
These methods are only capable of determining the expected extent of use of each 
line by each generator or load for a given scenario of operation, regardless of the 
time when this generator or load was installed. However, computing efficient grid 
charges with locational content requires considering – besides the electrical 
utilization of lines by agents - also how long generators, loads and lines have been 
in operation. In broad terms, the relative contribution of new or recent generators 
and loads to the recovery of the cost of new or recent lines must be higher than 
their relative contribution to these lines’ flows would indicate on the base of just 
electric use in current operation scenarios. The opposite can be said of network 
users that have existed for a long time with respect to new or recent lines: their 
actual contribution to the recovery of the incurred transmission costs should in 
general be smaller than the participation factors that result from the analysis of 
line utilization in present scenarios. As for the lines that were built a long time 
ago, there is no good reason to make any distinction between new generators or 
loads and the existing ones7. Remember that the entire purpose of this exercise is 
to design locational signals for new system agents, so that they can take into 
construction of new transmission lines. However, most methods to com
                                                 
7 Transmission lines are never removed, in practice, when their useful economic lives end. They 
are typically refurbished with new wires, insulators and even towers, so that they can continue 
their operation without an end in sight. As this refurbishing process takes place continuously, it is 
very difficult to assign responsibility for it to generators or loads on the basis of vintage.  
 18
consideration, in their siting decisions, the costs they will make the transmission 
network incur. 
As explained later in section 4 with more detail, when sending locational signals 
to each potential new generator or load, one must make the best estimate possible, 
e of the capacity of 
perception of the need to send vigorous locational signals to future generators and 
at the time when the decision to invest is made by the corresponding agent, of the 
network costs that will be incurred because of the decision of the agent to install a 
new plant or load. The construction of those lines installed long before this agent 
decides to build a new generator or load could only be affected to a limited extent 
by the decision of the aforementioned agent, since this decision could barely be 
anticipated when these lines were built. Quite analogously, at the time this agent 
decides the construction of a new generator or load, there is strong uncertainty 
about, if not inability to predict, the construction of those lines that would be built 
long after. Thus, sitting signals aimed at generators or loads should not include the 
cost of lines built long before or after the installation of the former. In other 
words, the percentage of the cost of lines to be allocated to agents in order to 
provide siting signals should only be paid by those network users that have been 
installed shortly before or after the installation of these lines.  
The percentage of the cost of lines to be recovered from siting signals may vary 
from one line to another and may well depend on the percentag
each line that is expected to be used by new generators and loads. The 
determination of the span of time during which it is assumed to be a direct 
implication between network investments and the siting decisions of the network 
users is a regulatory decision that should be based on educated guesses and the 
loads.  
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The remaining percentage of the cost of the “used” fraction of existing lines (i.e., 
the one not recovered from sitting signals to new generators and loads ), should be 
allocated on the basis of the incremental network usage made by generators and 
loads, regardless of the time when generators, loads and lines have been installed. 
 or after the time when a 
All this taken together results in the cost of lines being paid mainly by network 
users installed around the time when these lines are built, though other users of 
these lines contribute also to the recovery of their cost. 
Signals aimed at network users considering the possibility of exiting the system 
should probably be computed separately from those signals aimed at providing 
siting signals. Quite analogously to siting signals, exiting signals should include 
the cost of those lines that would be built short before
network user is considering exiting the system and whose construction would be 
avoided if this user finally decides to exit. Exiting signals can probably be 
estimated based on the use that these agents are making of some already existing 
lines but, in the end, these signals should only refer to the cost of those lines still 
to be built when each network user decides to exit the system and whose 
construction partly depends on the exiting decision by this agent. Note that exiting 
signals so computed would not alter the network costs paid by agents until they 
decide to leave the system, which will typically occur many years after the 
installation. Given that network charges paid by agents leaving the system will be 
faced by them long time after their installation, these charges are highly unlikely 
to condition their investment decisions. Therefore, the investment decisions of 
these agents should only be affected by the (installation) network charges 
developed in this article, apart from the agents’ expectation of economic signals 
of a different nature from network charges, like LMPs of energy.    
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Because of the reasons provided in the previous paragraphs, it is proposed here to 
strengthen the charges to be assigned to new generators and loads for the use of 
new lines, with respect to the charges they would be allocated according to just 
their incremental contribution to the flows of these lines. Correspondingly, 
st in 
3.6 The proposed approach 
 certain period of time 
locational grid charges to be assigned to the existing generators and loads 
corresponding to the cost of new lines should be smaller than those resulting from 
the application of a cost allocation method exclusively based on network use. 
Regarding lines that have already been in operation for a number of years (e.g., 
more than 5 or 10 years), the fraction of the cost of these lines that is allocated to 
each agent should be directly derived from their electrical utilization factors. 
Locational signals should be sent to any agent considering not only the installation 
of a new generator or load, but also an increase in the production or consumption 
capacity (that is to say, the contracted one) of an already existing network user. 
Thus, transmission charges to be paid by an agent if he finally decides to inve
new generation or load capacity (either as a new plant or load centre or within an 
already existing one) should reflect the increase in network costs that the system 
would incur in this case. Note that, as explained in section 4, once the agents have 
installed new capacity, their charges should not be affected by their actual use of 
the grid. Otherwise, siting signals would be weakened and operation decisions by 
agents would be conditioned by the recovery of the cost of existing lines, which 
does not depend on operation decisions by the agents.   
Figure 1 shows the process that is proposed here to compute locational 
transmission tariffs while taking into account temporal considerations. It must be 
stressed here that this process should be repeated every
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(every year, for example). As a result of this process, transmission tariffs to be 
nes this 
paid by all network users in the system would be computed. However, only the 
tariffs to be paid by generators or loads that apply for connection this year would 
be actually charged. As explained in section 4.1, transmission tariffs to be paid by 
network users must be computed at the time when they decide to enter the system 
and they should not be changed afterwards. Long term signals related to the cost 
of the network that are sent through transmission tariffs should go alongside time-
varying operational signals. Transmission tariffs so computed will not be able to 
recover the whole cost of the grid. The fraction of the cost of the grid not 
recovered through these tariffs should be socialized, probably to demand. 
First, one must specify the fraction of the cost of each line to be allocated based 
on cost causality principles. For those transmission lines that have been operating 
for longer than a prescribed number of years, this fraction should typically be 
100%. As explained in section 3.3, for recently built transmission li
fraction could be equal to the ratio of the loading rate of each line to the average 
load rate for the corresponding type of lines in the same area. The fraction of the 
line cost to be allocated based on each agent’s responsibility in its construction is 
represented byα , while that allocated according to other criteria is represented by 
1 - α . From now on, the fraction α  of the cost of each line will be referred to as 
the cost of the ‘used’ fraction of the line. Parameter α  may vary over the useful 
life of each line. For each considered year of operation, this parameter α refers to 
the fraction of he capacity of each line that will be used at least under some 
operating conditions, even when these are not likely to occur frequently. 
Therefore, the parameter 1
t
α− refers to the fraction of e transmission capacity of 
the line that is not expected to be used the corresponding year under any set of 
th
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circumstances. Note that the fraction (1 - α ) of the cost of each line, which is 
deemed not be allocated based on cost causality principles when computing tariffs 
to be paid by new network users each year, should not be mistaken for the fraction 
of the cost of each line that is finally not recovered from transmission tariffs 
presented in this article. However, in both cases the remaining part of the cost of 
the line is deemed to be socialized to demand. 
Next, following the guidelines provided in section 3.4, the cost of the ‘used’ 
fraction of each line is divided into a fraction β  to be paid by generators and the 
remaining fraction 1 β−  to be paid by demand. The parameter β  should be 
determined according to the global responsibility of generation on the one hand, 
n
, in n
and demand, on the other, in the construction of each line. According to the 
methodology outlined in section 3.2, the respo sibility of each group of agents, 
generators and loads the construction of a line, should be determi ed based on 
the aggregate incremental flows expected to be produced by agents of each type.   
Thus, locational charges for consumers corresponding to each line l  in the system 
would amount to lCTα β⋅ ⋅  , where lCT  is the cost of line l , while locational 
charges for generators would amount to (1 ) CTα β l⋅ − ⋅ . The contribution of each 
generator (respectively consumer) to the recovery of the fraction of the cost a line 
l  that generators (respectively load) are deemed responsible for would be a 
function of the elec e that the agent is expected to make of the grid, the 
time the line has been operating for and th nerator (respectively load) 
has been operating for. Thus, we must define utilization factors representing the 
pected incremental use that each generator or load will make of the line. The 
method adopted along the guidelines set in section 
trical us
e time the ge
ex
3.2 must be used for this. 
Utilization factors of line l  are represented as G i
lC  for each generator i  and D j
lC  
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for each load j . We must also define factors representing how long each 
generator, load and line have been operating for at the considered point in time 
(the point in time that the considered scenario refers to). These are lk  for line 
l , Gik  for generator i  and Djk  for demand j . The expression of the participa  
factor of generator i  in the recovery of the fraction of the cost of line l  to be paid 
by generators because of their responsibility in the construction of this line is: 
   (1 )  Gi Gi l Gi
l lCP C k k= ⋅ +                                                                                    (3)    
n nalogous expre sion c  be obtained r loads, thus obtaining participation 
factors
tion
                             
A  a s an fo
Dj
lCP . The mathematical expression of factors lk , Gik and Djk  as a function of 
time must be defined a priori8. Lastly, participation factors lCP  and Gi Dj
lCP
 can 
 of 
                          
a ression of this scale 
generators and loads should be scaled up or down so that the aggregate 
contribution of each group of agents, based on their aggregate responsibility in the 
line cos the one computed in advance. Hence, the locational charge to be paid 
by generator i  corresponding to its responsibility in the cost of line l be 
computed as:  
 (1 ) (1 )  lGi l Gi l GiP CT C k k CSα β= ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅                                                            (4)  
where GiP  is the locational transmission charge to be paid by generator i  
corresponding to line l and CS  is the aforementioned scale factor for the same 
generator.  
t, is 
The m thematical exp factor is: 
1
                 
1  
(1 )
ng
i
i=
+∑
                                                                          (5)                              
l Gk k
                                                
Gi
l
CS
C
=
 
8 One may think of implementing factors whose initial value is quite high (5, for example). These 
factors would decrease in value over time until they are zero after a certain number of years (for 
example, 10 years after the entry into service of the corresponding line or plant). 
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where is the number of generators in the system. Equations (3), (4) and (5) 
result in factors representing the relative responsibility of agents in the 
construction
ng
 of lines using only a certain scenario. With the passing of time, these 
ors of these lines by the 
aforementioned agents. 
factors tend towards the incremental use fact
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Figure 1: Process of computation of transmission charges 
4 Other implementation aspects of the design of 
transmission charges 
As mentioned before, designing transmission charges involves not only 
developing the methodology for computing the responsibility of agents in the cost 
of the transmission grid, but also providing adequate answers to many 
implementation issues that are seldom treated in the existing literature. This 
 implementation of locational section discusses the most relevant aspects of the
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transmission grid charges that are not directly related to the cost allocation 
algorithm. These include the identification of the snapshots that should be taken 
The network agents benefit from the existence of a new line during many different 
operating conditions, only a few of which correspond to the system peak load. 
Therefore, the cost of the ‘used’ fraction of each line should be allocated taking 
into account a set of scenarios corresponding to a wide range of operating 
conditions that may take place in the system. Besides, and in order for the 
locational signals resulting from grid charges to influence the decision by market 
ad, agents should know the value 
into account for the computation of annual transmission charges and the way in 
which the results obtained for these snapshots about the use of lines by generators 
and loads should be combined to compute these charges; the format or structure of 
the transmission charges that network users will have to pay; the procedure to 
update the charges whenever it is necessary; and grandfathering issues that may 
arise in the transition time to a full application of a new transmission charges 
procedure.  
4.1 The scenarios to be considered 
agents on where to install new generation or lo
of these signals before the new power plant or load centre is built. The set of 
scenarios employed to compute the grid locational signal to be sent to a potential 
new power plant should correspond to the future expected operation of the 
system, where it is assumed that the new power plant or demand has been already 
installed. All in all, tariffs should be published a priori based on the expected 
future operation of the system over a set of scenarios that are representative of the 
different set of situations that may exist in the future, once the considered 
generator or load has entered into operation. Tariffs must be computed once and 
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for all considering not only one scenario but a set of representative scenarios. 
These scenarios must reflect the incremental network utilization that this 
generator or load will make of transmission lines.   
The construction of new lines is mainly aimed at reducing the operation costs of 
the system that are related to the existence of the transmission grid, namely: a) the 
cost of transmission losses; b) congestion costs, or costs due to the existence of 
congestion in the system. Given that transmission losses and congestion may, in 
principle, occur at any time during the year, the allocation of the cost of the ‘used’ 
fraction of each line should be based on a set of scenarios that are representative 
of all the different operating conditions that may take place. Before assigning the 
he cost of each line should be 
cost of the ‘used’ fraction of each line to agents, one must determine the weights 
to be given to the different scenarios that must be considered in this process. In 
other words, one must determine the part of the cost of the ‘used’ fraction of each 
line to be assigned according to the responsibility of agents in the total use made 
of the line in each one of the former scenarios. 
First of all, one must estimate which fraction of new grid investments, in terms of 
cost, is aimed at reducing line losses and, therefore, which fraction is aimed at 
reducing grid congestion. A correct estimation of this split has to be made by the 
professionals in charge of transmission expansion in the considered power system. 
The final result will depend on the system’s specific characteristics, but it will 
probably be in the realm of 50/50 (contrary to the common believe that peak load 
conditions are the only ones that matter). T
apportioned between the fraction aimed at reducing losses and the fraction aimed 
at reducing congestion proportionately to the expected reduction in the cost of 
losses and the expected reduction in the cost of congestion, over the whole useful 
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life of the line, that the construction of the line would cause. If 50/50 is assumed, 
50% of the cost of the ‘used’ fraction of each line should be allocated to the 
different scenarios in proportion to the level of losses in the line in each scenario. 
The remaining 50% of the cost should be allocated to agents taking only into 
account those scenarios where there is a significant level of congestion in the 
system, which will typically be the peak load scenarios. Each peak load scenario 
should be weighted according to the load rate of the line in it. As it has just been 
mentioned, once it has been determined which part of the cost of the ‘used’ 
fraction of a line must be assigned in each scenario, this part must be allocated to 
the generators and loads operating in this scenario in proportion to the 
responsibility of each one in the total use of the line. 
The volume of the transmission charge that is assigned to each network user is not 
the only thing that matters. The format or structure of the tariff itself is important, 
since a poor design (as the one most frequently used9) can interfere seriously with 
an efficient behaviour of the network users in the electricity market.  
To the extent possible, operation decisions by the network users, which are short 
term decisions, must be kept independent from the level of
4.2 The format (structure) of the transmission tariffs 
 the transmission 
h should be a charge paid by these agents to recover the total network costs, whic
long term signal. If one wants to send short-term locational signals, this can be 
conveniently done via nodal energy prices (locational marginal prices, LMP in the 
                                                 
9 Most systems have traditionally adopted a two part transmission tariff. Tariffs are normally 
divided into a capacity charge, which is aimed at allocating the fraction of the cost of
is needed to serve the peak load, and an energy charge, aimed at allocating the cos
 the grid that 
t of those lines 
built in order to reduce congestion and losses. The capacity term is a uniform charge per unit of 
power contracted, in the case of loads, per unit of power installed, in the case of generators, or per 
unit of power injected into or retrieved from the grid in the peak load scenario. The energy term is 
a uniform charge per unit of energy produced or consumed. Unlike most tariff designs, the tariffs 
proposed in this paper aim not to distort the decisions by agents. Thus, these tariffs differ from the 
design that has just been described.  
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US terminology). By packaging transmission tariffs in the format of energy 
charges (€/MWh), i.e. a charge that depends on the amount of energy produced or 
consumed by the corresponding agent, the network users will have to internalize 
these charges in their energy bids to the Power Exchange or in their bilateral 
contracts, therefore causing an unwanted distortion in the original market 
behaviour of these agents and the outcome –both prices and quantities- of the 
wholesale market.  
It is then concluded that the charge should have the format of a capacity charge 
(€/MW.year) or of just an annual charge (€/year). The first option runs into the 
problem of applying the same charge to a 300 MW base loaded plant and to a 300 
MW peaking unit that only operates a few hundred hours per year (the same 
difficulty happens with demands with widely different utilization factors and the 
a single value Gk and Lk without taking into consideration the production and 
demand patterns of the several generators or loads that might be connected at a 
same contracted capacity). The transmission charge should therefore be an annual 
charge (€/year) that must be computed based on the expected network costs that 
each agent (or type of agent) will make the system incur. Note here that applying 
the same fixed charge to all network users, regardless of their characteristics, 
would be even more discriminatory than applying capacity charges. The proposed 
fixed charges could be conveniently split into equal monthly instalments.  
Still there is one difficulty left, which is very much related to the material in the 
previous section 4.1. Two transmission charges, Gks and Lks, are computed at each 
node k and for each scenario s. But they should not be weighed and combined into 
given node k. The charge for the 300 MW base-loaded plant at k should not be 
equal to the charge for the 300 MW peaking unit connected at the same node. 
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Same considerations apply to demands with very different patterns. It would be 
possible (but not desirable) to compute tailor-made charges for each network user 
4.3 Updating scheme for transmission charges  
 prospective investors on where to install 
that this signal must be independent of the actual use of the grid by the network 
that take into account its actual production or demand (historical or expected) for 
all the considered scenarios. Apparently this is a good idea, since the resulting 
locational signals would be passed to the network users, who logically should 
internalize them in their short-term behaviour. However, this is undesirable, since 
nodal energy prices (or LMP) are already the complete efficient locational signals 
that should be sent in the short-term. Therefore, any additional locational signal 
would result in some distortion. For instance, when applied to generators, this 
would cause them to internalize transmission tariffs in their energy bids, distorting 
their short-term behaviour.  
A method to decouple transmissions charges from the short-term behaviour of 
network users is to define “generic” per unit transmission charges for generators 
of different kinds and production profiles and also for a set of “characteristic” 
loads (perhaps only on the basis of their utilization factors), but without linking 
the value of the charges to the actual performance of generators or loads during 
any given year.  
The main objective of the proposed locational grid charges is to send a signal that 
can have an influence on the decisions of
new generation or load (locational signals for loads are of lesser interest, as 
discussed before). The locational signal that is given to a prospective network user 
must be the best possible estimate, at the time when the decision to invest is made, 
of the transmission grid costs that it will make the system incur. It has been shown 
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user. In other words, in order to avoid distortions in the operational decisions of 
the agents, their utilization of the grid should not have any influence on the 
transmission charges that they will finally have to pay.  
ission locational charges, 
velopment of the expansion plan of the 
It logically follows that the total transmission charges to be paid by the new 
network user should be announced and committed before the decision to invest is 
made. Otherwise, if the given number is only an estimate and there is a history of 
large deviations between estimates and real charges, the locational signals become 
meaningless.  
Therefore, the locational transmission charge to be paid by a generator that will be 
installed in a certain node should be computed and published before the generator 
is actually connected to the grid. Once the generator is in operation, this charge 
should be applied either as a one-shot payment or as a collection of payments that 
add up to the total amount previously computed. Transm
to be levied on the new generators or loads that are installed in a year ‘n’, should 
be computed taking into account a set of scenarios that are deemed to be 
representative of the operation of the system throughout the M year period starting 
at year ‘n’ and ending in year ‘n+M’, where M should, in principle, be the length 
of the study horizon considered for the de
transmission grid. In practice, ‘M’ should not exceed 10 years. This is due to the 
effect of the discount rate and to the fact that the further one moves into the future, 
the less certain are the hypotheses that have been used to estimate the charges.  
One drawback of this scheme of tariffs is the fact that, at least for some generators 
and loads, the locational charges they have to pay might significantly deviate from 
those who would have been computed a posteriori. Besides, as already 
acknowledged in section 3.5, transmission tariffs computed according to method 
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proposed here will not recover the whole cost of the grid. As explained in section 
3.6 when presenting the algorithm for the computation of tariffs, the difference 
between the cost of the grid and the amount recovered through the application of 
these tariffs should be socialized to demand. This is the same solution proposed in 
sections 3.3 and 3.6 to allocate the cost of the unused fraction of the capacity of 
each line when computing transmission tariffs to be paid by generators and loads 
4.4 Grandfathering issues 
f regime is implemented, the 
smission charges that these senior network 
whose construction is decided each year. However, the amount to be socialized to 
demand in one case and the other may differ.   
A drastic change in the design of transmission charges can make some network 
users unhappy, if they end up having to pay much more than with the original 
method. In order to mitigate this problem, some exceptions to the general rules 
could be allowed for the incumbent generators and loads. For instance, the new 
system of transmission charges may not be applied to the generators and demands 
that have participated in the system for a long time (e.g. more than 10 years), so 
they can continue with the existing regime. Alternatively, charges applied to these 
agents could gradually evolve from the current regime to the new one during a 
prescribed number of years. Once the new tarif
difference between the current tran
users pay and the ones they would have had under the new regime would have to 
be socialized to demand. 
The loss of efficiency caused by this grandfathering scheme would probably be 
minimal from a siting viewpoint, since these agents have been located in the 
network for a long time and a change in transmission charges is unlikely to force 
them out of the system or to relocate. Efficiency losses from an operational 
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viewpoint would also be minimal since, if the guidelines in section 4.2 are 
followed, the transmission tariffs should not have an impact on the short-term 
operation of generators or loads.  
5 Numerical results 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the per unit locational transmission charges for 
new generators in the Spanish system that result from the application of the 
proposed methodology. These numbers correspond to just one scenario of 
operation: the 2006 winter peak load. The considered snapshot corresponds to 
January 18th 2006 at 19:30 hours. Total load in the Spanish system in this 
snapshot is around 29.600 MW while total power produced is around 30.000 MW. 
The transmission grid that has been modelled is comprised of 416 nodes and 692 
lines. The geographical distribution of load and power production in the system 
for the considered snapshot is provided in Table I referring to 5 different areas 
divided into: Northwest, North, East Central and 
 
that the Spanish system has been 
South. Net exports to Portugal are close to 250 MW while net imports from 
France are about 280 MW. Charges have been computed for all the nodes of the 
400 and 220 kV transmission grids. 
Only one scenario has been used, because of the lack of data corresponding to 
other operating conditions. However, in real life, tariffs should take into account 
the expected operation of the system in a number of scenarios representative of 
the different operating conditions that may exist once the considered generator or 
load has entered into operation. This is explained in section 4.1. 
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Table 1: Geographical distribution of load and generation in the Spanish system for the 
snapshot corresponding to January 18th 2006 at 19:30 
AREA GENERATION DEMAND
EAST 6253.2 6778.8
NORTHWEST 7017.0 2614.1
NORTH 4016.2 3121.2
CENTRE 6827.2 11404.9
SOUTH 5919.1 5686.0  
For the sake of facilitating the presentation of the results and contrary to what has 
een proposed in section 5.2, the numerical values are expressed as an energy 
harge (€/MWh) so that they can be compared to other grid locational signals, 
 dot 
in the figure refers to a different grid node. Its colour and size represents the level 
of the unit transmission charge that should be levied on the new generation that is 
installed in that node. For the sake of clarity, the coloured dots only portray values 
in the range of (-2 to +4.5 €/MWh). The colour of dots ranges from dark blue for 
the lowest transmission charges (-2€/MWh) to dark red for the highest ones 
b
c
such as those corresponding to transmission losses and congestion costs. Each
(+4.5€/MWh). The size of dots increases with the level of the corresponding 
charges between -2€/MWh and 4€/MWh. Outliers, i.e. those values that are above 
or below this range, have been represented using square boxes, if they are positive 
charges, and crosses, if they are negative, so that typical values for charges can be 
represented more accurately. Transmission charges, including the outliers, range 
between -3€/MWh and 11€/MWh. Only 10% of the computed charges have been 
classified as outliers.  
Numerical results presented here are not an estimation of the locational signals 
that should eventually be sent to new generators if the proposed mechanism were 
implemented, since only one scenario has been considered. The values appear to 
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be very reasonable. Exporting areas (those located in the North Western part of 
the country, like Galicia and Asturias) exhibit the highest charges for new 
generators, while importing areas (those where demand is significantly larger than 
generation, like Catalonia in the North Eastern part of the country, or Madrid, in 
the centre) exhibit the lowest ones. The computational requirements are quite 
modest, and no practical problem is envisioned in extending the analysis to any 
ere created from the original one. In each of them, 
desired number of scenarios.  
Transmission charges should be long term economic signals that drive the 
decisions by agents on the location of new generation and load. Therefore, these 
charges should evolve gradually over time. In other words, they should be 
relatively stable charges. In order to evaluate the stability of charges, several 400 
MW fictitious power plants were separately included in the original scenario in 
several areas of the system, with the objective of evaluating the impact that 
installing them or not would have on the locational signals for these areas. 
Hopefully they would not change much, and the signals would be sufficiently 
stable. Several new scenarios w
a new 400 MW power plant was included in a different 400 kV node of the 
transmission grid. Nodes chosen for considering the installation of a new plant 
were located in the North West (Galicia), the North-Western part of the central 
plateau, the North-East (Catalonia), the Eastern coast (Valencia), the country’s 
centre (Madrid) and the South (Andalucía). As expected, transmission charges to 
new generators in the areas where a new plant had been included increased 
slightly with respect to the original ones. The average increase in transmission 
charges was slightly smaller than 1 €/MWh, while the maximum increase 
computed for the transmission charge in a node was of 2.26 €/MWh. Given the 
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range of variation of the values of transmission charges in Figure 2, one may 
conclude that the locational signals that are provided by the proposed method are 
quite stable.  
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Figure 2: Distribution in the Spanish system of per unit locational transmission charges for 
new generators resulting from the application of the proposed methodology. Only one 
scenario corresponding to the 2006 winter peak load has been considered. Values are 
expressed in €/MWh.  
6 Final Remarks 
This paper has presented a comprehensive review of the many different issues that 
have to be considered in the design and implementation of transmission network 
charges with a locational content. It has also proposed specific responses to each 
one of these issues. As it is frequently the case in regulation, there is some amount 
of judgement involved in some of the choices, and other options are possible. 
Although the proposed approach is meant to be general, other choices could be 
 network users to internalize the cost of any new grid 
reinforcements that may be associated to their siting decisions, when considering 
the installation of new generation or load. The numerical results that have been 
more advisable under specific circumstances The resulting tariffs are meant to 
encourage potential
 36
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bility of implementing these charges. It must be 
ete picture. 
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obtained confirm the advisa
stressed here that the proposed transmission charges have a different purpose than 
LMPs, and they are meant to be used besides LMPs, not instead of them. The 
objective of these transmission charges is to efficiently recover the regulated cost 
of the grid. 
This study has only considered the locational signals that are associated to 
transmission network costs, that is, the costs of constructing, operating and 
maintaining transmission facilities. Obviously, other energy infrastructure-related 
costs with locational component should also be taken into account by agents when 
deciding where to install new power plants or loads, such as the costs of access to 
gas supply or any reduction of revenues due to network losses and constraints, in 
addition to the cost of the land, other local costs such as taxes, access to cooling 
water, roads or other facilities. Under the present conditions in many countries of 
scarcity of network capacity and abundance of applications for connection to the 
grid, locational signals derived from transmission charges should be an ingredient 
of the compl
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